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 1. Introduction 
 
This  paper contributes to the growing literature which aims to link barriers to competition on product 
markets and factor demand. The recent decline in economic growth in some European countries has 
intensified the debate surrounding the question of the extent to which the inertia of highly regulated 
labour and product markets has a negative impact on the creation of jobs and unemployment. Since the 
timing of UK and US product market deregulation, which began in the late 1970s, fits neatly into the 
picture of diverging labour market performance dating back to the 1980s, the regulatory product market 
environment is a smoking gun of sorts for divergent labour market performances across countries [see, 
e.g., Blanchard and Tirole (2004) and Nickell et al. (2005)]. 
In recent years the OECD has produced an internationally-comparable set of indicators that measure the 
degree to which policies promote or inhibit employment and competition in various areas of the product 
market.
1 A broad range of policies and institutional arrangements have influenced these differences. 
Using a multidimensional clustering approach, Boeri et al. (2000) have grouped the OECD countries 
into various clusters of institutional rigidities according to the degree of labour and product market 
regulation. They have identified four groups: (a) countries which combine tight regulation in both 
labour and product markets (France, Italy, Greece and Spain); (b) continental European countries with 
relatively restrictive product market regulation but with different employment protection legislation 
(Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Portugal being more restrictive than Belgium and 
Denmark); (c) common law countries characterised by a relatively liberal approach in both labour and 
product markets (US, UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand), and (d) Sweden, which 
together with Japan, combines relatively restrictive labour market regulation with relatively few product 
market restrictions.
2 
All this is by way of prologue. A proper discussion of the effects that changing product market 
competition brings to the rest of the economy demands that policy oriented debate is placed within the 
context of economic theory.
3 Once one moves away from the idea of a simple world where firms have 
perfect foresight, additional linkages and further questions suggest themselves. In particular, in an 
                                                           
1  See  http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html. The indicator on 
product market regulation focuses on a subset of government-imposed restrictions. These include state control, 
barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, and economic and administrative regulation. The 
indicator on employment protection summarises regulation for regular and temporary contracts. The 'Doing 
Business Database' of the Worldbank also provides alternative measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement in international comparison. This dataset covers 145 countries and is benchmarked to January 2004 
(see, http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/). 
2 A number of insightful empirical studies have analysed the linkages between product market regulations and 
employment using these cardinal indicators, including Alesina et al. (2005), Angrist and Kugler (2003), Hayri and 
Dutz (1999), IMF (2005) and Koedijk and Kremers (1996). These studies, however, suffer from two problems. 
First, most studies use country data, which “aggregates out” the true dynamics of factor demand. Second, either 
employment or investment is investigated instead of modelling them jointly. 
3 Bayoumi et al. (2004), for example, have tackled the impact of regulation on the aggregate growth and welfare 
in a general-equilibrium simulation model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in product and 
  2uncertain environment barriers to competition may affect not only the level of investment/hiring but 
also the timing of investment/hiring. Hence we contribute to the literature by taking the route of a real 
options modelling framework to shed more light on the regulation – factor demand nexus.
4 
Against this background, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the 
theoretical model. Section 3 focuses on our main research question – posed in the title of the paper – 
namely, how much of the labour-abundant versus job-poor growth experiences can barriers to 
competition explain? Finally, based on our results, some concluding remarks are offered in section 4. 
 
2. A Real Options Model of (Partially) Irreversible Interrelated Factor Demand Decisions 
 
Recent theoretical analyses of factor demand under uncertainty have highlighted the effects of 
irreversibility in generating “real options”. In these models the interaction of time-varying uncertainty 
and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction where factor demand is zero as the firm prefers to “wait 
and see” rather than undertaking a costly action with uncertain consequences. Indeed, waiting allows 
firms to gather new information on the uncertain future. Bowman and Maskowitz (2001, p. 777) have 
recently concluded that the real options approach "encourages experimentation and the proactive 
exploration of uncertainty" and thus a “revolution in thinking”. Below we therefore develop a real 
options model with two types of inputs (capital and labour) and a rich specification of adjustment costs. 
Given the model, we can characterise specific channels through which the impact of product market 
regulation unfolds.  
 
2.1.  Analytical Framework 
 
We now describe the partial equilibrium modelling framework in detail. To keep the analysis simple, 
we consider a representative firm facing the following Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
(1)  , 
α α − =
1
t t t L aK Y 1 0 < <α , 
 
where Y  denotes real output, L  is the total number of employees, K  is the capital stock, α is the 
distribution parameters between K  and  , and a denotes a positive parameter measuring the 
t t t
t t L
                                                                                                                                                                                        
labor markets. They find that greater competition produces large effects on macroeconomic performance, as 
measured by standard indicators. 
4 The analogy arises because factor adjustment costs are at least partially sunk. The consequences of uncertainty 
for the optimal conduct of factor demand have been a very active field of research in recent years. Amran and 
Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and Antikarov (2001), Coy (1999) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) summarise the 
principle features of this class of model. 
  3productivity of available technology.
5   is subject to changes due to depreciation of capital stocks and 
the optimal (dis-)investment decisions by the firm over time. Similarly, L  is subject to changes due to 
quits and/or the optimal employment (hiring and firing) decisions by the firm. We allow for imperfect 
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where p represents the real price, Z  denotes a random variable describing demand shocks, and ψ is an 
elasticity parameter that takes its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition [see, Abel and Eberly 















− = − =
−
−








Thus, equation (2) can also be written as: 
 
(4)  t t Z Y f p D η
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The current profits stream, measured in units of output, is defined as: 
 










where   denotes gross physical (dis-)investment, M  represents gross changes in employment due to 
hiring and firing, and quits from employees, w is the constant real wage, and x represents constant 
service expenses. The costs of adjusting K  and   are captured by the functions C  and 
t I t
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5  This assumption is made for expositional convenience and plays no crucial role for the qualitative results 




λ − = ,  
 
where δ   is the constant depreciation rate of physical capital and λ   is the exogenous quit rate of 
employment. It is assumed that the demand factor Z follows a geometric Brownian motion 
 
(8)  t t t t dW Z dt Z dZ σ η + = , 
 
where W  is a Wiener process,  t dt t t ε = dW  (since  t ε  is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), η is the drift term and σ  is the variance parameter.
6 Thus, 
we have an optimal stopping problem – the firm must determine when it is optimal to purchase/sell 
physical capital and/or hire/fire workers, given the stochastic evolution of Z.  
To keep the model simple we abstract from taxes. The representative risk-neutral firm maximises its 
discounted flow of profits.
7  The firm’s factor demand decisions are the outcome of the following 
intertemporal profit maximisation 
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where r is the constant real interest rate and  Et[⋅] denotes the mathematical expectation given the 
information set available to the firm. The following assumptions of adjustment costs guarantee that the 
firm’s problem is well-behaved.
8 The total costs of physical investment and employment adjustment are 
determined by:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
presented below. The impact of a CES production function is covered in Chen and Funke (2004), for example. 
6 A standard assumption in the real options literature is that investment does not resolve uncertainty; it is time that 
resolves uncertainty. Clearly, this exogeneity assumption will not be valid for certain factor demand decisions in 
which the firm gains the critical information due to the fact that it has invested. For example, R&D related 
employment and investment decisions will give the firm information about the likelihood of a product´s success. 
Models of information acquisition in which the stochastic environment is not given but can be influenced have 
been developed by Cukierman (1980) and Demers (1991). Cukierman (1980) demonstrates a model in which a 
firm decides which of a range of investment projects to undertake, and "buys" information by waiting, reducing 
the probability of losses from launching an unsuccessful product. Demers (1991) has a model of a firm which is 
uncertain about the demand in a particular market, and updates its beliefs according to a Bayesian rule after 
receiving information through signals. 
7 Hence, we abstract from additional dimensions of employment protection which arise when agents are risk 
averse. In this case employment protection can serve as a substitute for insurance in incomplete markets. 
8 We therefore depart from the standard assumption that capital (labour) is quasi-fixed while labour (capital) can 
be adjusted without cost. The idea to examine employment and investment decisions simultaneously using a real 
options modelling framework is not new. It can be traced back to Eberly and van Mieghem (1997). The analysis 
accomplished by these authors, however, has not addressed the impact of barriers to competition upon factor 
demand. 
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Equations (10) and (11) have some distinguishing features that warrant discussion. With no (dis-) 
investment of K and L, the firm can avoid these fixed costs. Purchase (sale) costs are the costs of buying 
(selling) or hiring (firing) capital. Let   ( ) be the lump-sum price per unit of investment good at 
which the firm can buy (sell) any amount of capital. Similarly,   ( ) be the sunk costs when the 
firm paying for hiring (firing) a marginal employee. Note that the firm can sell the redundant physical 
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10 Adjustment costs of   and  () I C ( ) M H  
are continuous and strictly convex in I and M so as to satisfy and CII , HMM > 0 with the positive 
parameters of γ and µ .
11 
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The first five terms on the right-hand sides represent the current profit and the sixth and seventh terms 
denote the changes of V due to depreciation and quits in K and L respectively. The last two terms 
indicate the impact of demand fluctuations. 
                                                           
9 Chen and Funke (2004) have generalised the standard model of irreversible factor demand by introducing a 
second fully reversible technology which produces the same output, but at a higher marginal cost. They examine 
the trade-off between the adjustment of the labour force and hours of work. In their model, firms can optimise on 
two margins and therefore variations in hours worked serve as a substitute for variations in the numbers of 
employees.   
10 We are not assuming symmetric adjustment costs due to the fact that they are at odds with the data. The 
rejection is stronger as the level of data disaggregation rises (e.g. from industry to firm). Using Dutch data, Pfann 
and Verspagen (1989), for example, obtain evidence in favour of asymmetric adjustment costs.  
11 In practice, hiring costs associated with successfully filling a vacancy will consist of search costs and human 
capital investment in the worker. Firing costs consist of all costs that are related to a dismissal, especially compen-
sation and costs of legal disputes. 
  6 
2.2. First-Order Conditions for I and M 
 
The standard result of real options theory is the prediction of optimal decision rules when to hire 
(invest) or fire (dis-invest). The rules are usually specified in terms of critical thresholds, or trigger 
values, describing the exercise region of the involved options. The width of the corridor between these 
trigger values is a measure of the inertia in factor markets. Under the assumptions sketched out above, 
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where   . Substituting (13) into (11) and rearranging yields  K V q =
 










































The first-order condition for physical investment shows that the optimal investment strategy is a two-
trigger policy that can be expressed in terms of Tobin´s q. If q exceeds the upper threshold value   
gross physical investment occurs. In turn, if q falls below a lower threshold value  , negative 
investment takes place – the firm sells part of its capital stock. In the intermediate region of inaction 
, investment will be zero. The case of total reversible physical capital investment refers to 
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It is straightforward to verify that the optimal condition for M is  
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where    denoting the marginal product of labour. Substituting (16) into (12) and rearranging 
yields 
L V v =
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The first-order condition (17) shows that the optimal strategy is again a two-trigger policy that can be 
expressed in terms of the marginal product of labour,  . If v exceeds the upper threshold value ; the 
price of hiring a marginal employee; an additional worker will be hired. In turn, if v falls below a lower 
threshold value , the firm will fire a marginal employee by paying firing cost  . In the region of 
inaction  , the firm will neither hire nor fire. The case of total reversible employment 
decisions refers to the condition  , while the case  implies that capital is fully sunk. 
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Equations (14) - (18) are important for understanding the interaction between product market regulation 
and factor demand. Product market deregulation increases the competitive pressures among firms 
(lowers ψ), which lowers the markup. Thus for given wages  w w=  and service expenses  x = x , factor 
demand increase at the firm level. If the number of firms remains constant, this leads to higher 
employment because aggregate labour demand increases.
12 
 
                                                           
12  If product market deregulation also lowers entry costs, new entry further increases employment. A more 
competitive institutional setting will thus contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy through thriving 
entrepreneurial activity (Acemoglu et al., 2002). 
  82.3. The Optimal Stopping Problem for Capital and Labour 
 
Solving the optimal stopping problem requires a certain amount of finesse.
13 We first simplify the 
problem by observing that we have q  and   and   and    within the inaction 
regions for physical investment and employment decisions (I and M are zero). Alternatively, we can 
consider the cases of immediate adjustments of K and L (
+ = K p
− = K p q
+ = L p v
− = L p v
µ γ   and    in (10) and (11) are set to zero). The 
non-homogenous terms in equations (15) and (18) then disappear accordingly.  This implies that 
equations (15) and (18) can be written as follows: 
 









































The solutions for (19) and (20) consist of the particular and general solutions, i.e.   
and   or  . Given the above model, we can show that the following holds:
= + =
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where  1 β  and  2 β   are the positive and negative roots respectively of the following characteristic 
equation: 
 






















δβ β β σ r , 
 
                                                           
13 A mathematically rigorous analysis for models with a discrete set of states is given in Brekke and Øksendal 
(1994). 
14 The derivations of equations (21) - (26) require a degree of finesse. See Appendices A – D for details. In spirit, 
equations (21) - (22) are similar to Bertola and Caballero (1994), while equations (24) - (25) are similar to 
Bentolila and Bertola (1990). 
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where  3 β  and  4 β   are the positive and negative roots separately of the following characteristic 
equation: 
 
























δβ β β σ r , 
 
where  ,  and   and     are unknown parameters to be determined by the optimal stopping 
boundary conditions.  The set of boundary conditions that applies to this optimal stopping problem are 
composed by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. As long as the marginal revenue 
products lie inside these thresholds, the firm chooses to wait and do nothing. 
1 A 1 A 3 A 4 A
Let’s now define the investment and disinvestment thresholds for capitals by Z  and  , and the 
hiring and firing thresholds for labour by   and  . It is then easy to see that the inaction region of 
physical capital investment is denoted by 
+ K − K Z
+ L Z − L Z
+ − < < K K Z Z Z , and the inaction region of employment 
decisions by Z . Formally, the physical investment thresholds satisfy the following value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
+ − < < L L Z Z
15  
 
(27)  ,  () ()
+
+ + = + K K
G
K
P p Z q Z q
(28)  ,  () ()
−
− − = + K K
G
K
P p Z q Z q
(29)  () ( ) 0 ' ' = + + + K
G
K
P Z q Z q , 
(30)  () ( ) 0 ' ' = + − − K
G
K
P Z q Z q . 
 
                                                           
15 The systems are, in principles, similar to the works by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for solving employment 
decisions and by Abel and Eberly (1994) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) for solving the capital investment and 
employment decisions. 
  10Optimal employment decision-making implies that the hiring/firing thresholds satisfy the value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions 
 
(31)  ,  () ()
+
+ + = + L L
G
L
P p Z v Z v
(32)  ,  () ()
−
− − − = + L L
G
L
P p Z v Z v
(33)  () ( ) 0 ' ' = + + + K
G
K
P Z v Z v , 
(34)  () ( ) 0 ' ' = + − − L
G
L
P Z v Z v . 
 
In short, the firm solves the somewhat daunting system of equations given by (27) – (34) given the 
initial values of K and L to obtain the threshold for purchasing physical capital, Z , the threshold for 
selling physical capital, Z , the threshold for hiring a marginal worker, Z , and the threshold for 
firing a marginal employee,  . Note that it is reasonable to expect the thresholds for   and   a 
to be different since the sunk costs are different, and the q and v equations are different for given levels 
of  K and L. Over time, the thresholds for Z  and    should change since there exist fixed 
depreciation rate for physical capital and exogenous quit rate for workers. The same discussions are 
also applied to the thresholds for Z  and  . We are now in a position to calibrate our model and 









− K L Z
 
3. Numerical Simulations 
 
The complexity of the model necessitates numerical simulation because closed-form solutions cannot 
be derived. We therefore use numerical simulations to gain further insight into the results of the 
previous section, to have a “feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of the factor demand sensitivity to 
various structural characteristics of the environment in which firms operate. We hope to show that the 
insights gained from simulations are sufficiently rich to indicate that it provides a useful complement to 
theory.    
First we describe the data and parameter assumptions that will be required to calibrate the model. The 
unit time length corresponds to one year and annual rates are used when applicable. Where possible, 
parameter values are drawn from empirical studies. Our base parameters which were chosen for realism 
are σ = 0.1, η = 0.0, r = 0.05, δ = 0.05, λ  = 0.08, ψ = 1.5, α = 0.7, w = 1.0, a = 14.5, p , 
 (50% of  ),  ,   and x = 1.2 (10% of  ). For simplicity, we normalise 
capital and labour such that K = L = 2.0.
0 . 12 =
+
K




K p 1 . 0 =
+





16 The firing and hiring parameters are consistent with those in 
                                                           
16 The calibrated model is not based on detailed time series data in the way econometric models are and does not 
have the predictive power of the latter. Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise 
  11Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for Germany. Their estimated firing costs for Germany are in the range 
0.562 ≤   ≤ 0.750 and their hiring cost estimate (excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 0.066 
of the average annual wage. Our specification ( ) is also broadly consistent with the recruiting 
and training cost of two months in Mortenson and Pissarides´ (1999) calibration. They suggest that this 
number is consistent with survey results reported in Hamermesh (1993). The price elasticity of demand 
parameter is set at Ψ = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). Ramey and Shapiro (2001) suggest that  
 is quite realistic. In practice, measuring product market competition is a complex task. 
Given that product market competition cannot be measured directly, we need to use proxies. Following 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we think of the regulatory stance on the product markets as being 
captured, admittedly in abstract fashion, by the degree of product market competition, ψ. This conveys 









− = . 0
Results for various parameters are displayed in Figures 1 to 7 below. The threshold plots contain four 
lines plotted in the (K,  L) space for values for the firing and hiring thresholds (top and bottom 
boundaries) and the buy and sell capital thresholds (left and right boundaries). The four boundaries 
partition the state space into various domains. The (non-empty) interior region of the quadrangle is the 
region of inaction where I = M = 0 while outside the quadrangle firing vs. hiring and selling vs. buying 
will take place according to the optimal values of I and M. Eberly and van Mieghem (1997) have shown 
that the boundaries of the quadrangle are upward-sloping in the usual case of supermodularity (the 
production function F(K,L) has the property FKL > 0 and FLK > 0). Furthermore, they have shown that 
the boundaries separating different kinds of employment policies are everywhere flatter than the 45° 
line, and those for physical capital are steeper than this line in the supermodularity case. As the 
marginal revenue products evolve stochastically over time, the model predicts that the firm will 
undertake sporadic bursts of investment/hiring or disinvestment/firing. Which factor of production 
(capital or labour) is more flexible depends upon whether the investment and disinvestment thresholds 
are farther apart horizontally than the hiring and firing thresholds are apart vertically. Next we 
investigate various comparative statics of the quadrangle of inaction.
17 
First, we consider the employment and investment thresholds for alternative hiring and firing costs for a 
given degree of product market competition, ψ.  The numerical results are given in Figure 1. The left 
diagram can be labelled the “no labour market reform” scenario, the right diagram the “labour market 
reform” scenario. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
quantitative estimates of the impact of various labour market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative 
predictions of the model, and to see what we can learn from this model. 
17 The numerical boundary value problems are solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. 
For a description of the algorithm used to compute the numerical simulations, see Press et al. (2002). 













































3 . 0 =
−
L p 05 . 0 =
+
L p 0.6 L p
− =  and    0.1 L p
+ =  and   
Note: The level of Z is set to 1 in the numerical exercise. 
 
As expected, the major result of the calibrations is that lower hiring and firing costs ( and 
) lead to a smaller inaction area for otherwise identical parameters. Decreasing firing costs 
reduce the (upper) firing employment threshold and therefore more workers would become unemployed 
in a cyclical downturn because it is easier for firms to fire workers. On the other hand, the (lower) 
hiring employment threshold is only marginally affected. In common with other studies, our results thus 
indicate that lowering hiring and firing costs by itself has an asymmetric impact on the employment 
thresholds, i.e. the policy change encourages firing by more than it does hiring. Therefore, adjustment 
costs do not necessarily imply a higher equilibrium rate of unemployment in this “shock-based” 
framework and the overall employment impact of lower firing costs in real options framework may 
even be negative.
05 . 0 =
+
L p
3 . 0 =
−
L p
18 Conversely, one has to admit that heavier adjustment costs lead to microeconomic 
inflexibility [see, Caballero et al. (2004)]. This tends to hamper the Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction at the core of the growth engine in market economies.
19   
 
                                                           
18 These simulation results are consistent with previous theoretical and mixed empirical evidence on the impact of 
labour market regulations. See, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Nickell and Layard (1999). 
19 There is ample evidence that the shift of resources away from less productive and towards more efficient firms 
accounts for much of the growth in total factor productivity. High adjustment costs may disrupt this process of 
resource re-allocation [Caballero and Hammour (1996, 1998)].  
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Note: The level of Z is set to 1 in the numerical exercise. 
 
Figure 2 replicates the same graphs for ψ = 1.6, i.e. for a less competitive product market environment. 
Different policies are usually aimed at influencing outcomes in the markets to which they apply 
directly. Judging from Figure 1 and Figure 2, however, it is clear that heavier-handed product market 
regulation leads to significant cross-market interactions.
20  The comparison indicates how different 
degrees of product market regulation change the likelihood of future adjustments of capital and labour. 
A less competitive environment (higher ψ) discourages the hiring of new workers, but by the same 
token the firm will retain less workers in a recession. The overall impact is a noticeable decrease in the 
width of the no action quadrangle. The implication is that the degree of regulation can have important 
ramifications for employment dynamics. The resulting employment impact of changing ψ is further 
illustrated in the corresponding labour demand functions in Figure 3 for two alternative demand shocks 
Z (Z = 1 versus Z = 2). Heavier product market regulation decreases the competitive pressures among 
firms, which increases the markup. Thus for given wages  w w =  and service expenses  x = x , factor 
demand decreases at the firm level. Even if the number of firms remains constant, this leads to lower 
employment because aggregate labour demand decreases.
21 Similar graphs can be plotted for capital. 
 
                                                           
20 Therefore, accounting for cross-market effects appears to be an important element of good policy design. This 
leads to the “all or nothing” warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower (1998). They 
argue that piecemeal labour market reforms may have had so little success because they disregarded the 
complementarities between a broad range of policies and institutions. 
21 The discontinuous four-threshold microeconomic model is likely to result in smooth macroeconomic factor 
demand adjustment because of time aggregation and nonsynchronous adjustment by heterogeneous agents. The 
numerical results are consistent with the econometric estimates in OECD (2005) suggesting that cutting barriers to 
product market competition to “best practice” levels would increase GDP per head by 2.0 – 3.5 percent in the EU. 
  14Figure 3: Labour Demand Functions for ψ = 1.5 versus ψ = 1.6 
 
 
Admittedly, our analysis has been conducted in a highly simplified framework. Since lower barriers to 
product market competition may foster wage determination, we now consider endogenous wages. In the 
previous analysis we have abstracted from wage effects although it is well-known that unions are strong 
in regulated industries and therefore anticompetitive barriers to competition are likely to influence the 
outcome of the wage bargaining because firms can bear the cost of higher wages more easily and still 
break even.
22 Ceteris paribus this will induce firms to choose capital-labour ratios higher than in a 
competitive situation.
23 On the other hand, heightened product market competition tends to dissipate 
rents deriving from market power, thereby curbing wage premia. In order to throw further light on the 
issue of wage endogeneity, we assume that wages are determined according to 
 
(35)  () 1 3 . 0 85 . 0 − + = ψ w . 
 
Broadly speaking, tighter product market regulation (higher ψ) leads to higher wages. The implications 
of equation (35) are illustrated in Figure 4. The left panel of Figure 4 is identical to the left panel of 
Figure 1, while the right panel of Figure 4 gives the quadrangle (no action area) for ψ = 1.6 and 
therefore has to be compared with the left panel of Figure 2. As expected, the calibration results indicate 




Figure 4: The Two-Dimensional Quadrangle for ψ = 1.5 versus  ψ = 1.6, and 
Endogenous Wages w = 0.85 + 0.3(ψ - 1)  
                                                           
22 There is considerable empirical literature devoted to the study of labour rent-sharing in regulated industries. See 
Jean and Nicoletti (2002) for an empirical investigation and Hendricks (1986) for a survey, with particular 
emphasis on studies of the effects of deregulation on wages.    
23 The capital-labour ratio would not be optimal from a social perspective because the opportunity cost of labour 
to the society is lower than the cost of labour to the firm.   
24 Another implication of Figure 4 is that deregulation of product markets, for example moving from ψ = 1.6 to ψ 
= 1.5 should become relatively easier from a political economy perspective as it results in employment gains. 










































6 . 1 = ψ 5 . 1 = ψ  
Note: pL
- = 0.6; pL
+ = 0.1. The level of Z is set to 1 in the numerical exercise. 
 
Another relevant feature of the modelling framework is that firing costs create a hold-up problem [see, 
e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1998)] enabling insiders (incumbent workers) to bid up wages once they 
are employed.
25 In other words, firing costs make it difficult for firms to fire workers, so firms hesitate 
to hire them in the first place, strengthening the hand of workers who already have a job Below we 
therefore adapt our model to an insider-outsider mechanism where firing costs increase the bargaining 
power of incumbent workers [see, e.g., Díaz-Vázquez, P. and D.J. Snower (2003)]. For simplicity and 
for clarity of exposition we assume that wages are determined as 
 
(36)  ( )
− − − = L p w 6 . 0 2 . 0 1 
 
in this insider-outsider version of the modelling framework. Alternative barriers to competition and 




                                                           
25 In countries with higher firing costs a large share of workers with fixed-term contracts tend to insulate insiders 
(permanent workers) from adjustment, thereby increasing their bargaining power. Figure 5: The Two-Dimensional Quadrangle for ψ = 1.5 versus ψ = 1.6 and Insider-
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6 . 1 = ψ 3 . 0 =
−
L p 6 . 1 = ψ  and     6 . 0 =
−
L p  and    
Note: The level of Z is set to 1 in the numerical exercise. 
 
The insider-outsider version of the model shows that the four-threshold area is monotonically 
decreasing in ψ and  . In other words, insider-outsider considerations provide a channel which pulls 
the impact of firing costs via wages towards a negative impact on average employment. 
pL
−
Finally, cutting barriers to product market competition may also lower   and/or   and therefore 
entry and/or exit costs. Entry costs include all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur 
to start an industrial or commercial business. These include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits 





                                                           
26 The regulation of entry and exit indices aim at capturing the actual difficulty that an entrepreneur faces to start a 
business, from a legal perspective as well as in practice. For further information, see Djankov et al. (2002). The 
“Doing Business” database of the Worldbank (see http://www.doingbusiness.org/Default.aspx) divides the process 
of starting and closing a company into distinct procedures, and calculates the costs and time necessary for 
accomplishing each procedure under normal circumstances. The OECD product market regulation database (see 
  17costs measure the time and cost involved in insolvency proceedings (for example, the average time to 
complete a procedure, the cost of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the recovery rate, which calculates 
how many cents on the dollar claimants recover from an insolvent firm).
27 In Figure 6 and 7, the 
implications of alternative entry and exit cost regimes are illustrated graphically. 
 
Figure 6: Capital Demand for ψ = 1.5 versus ψ = 1.6 and Alternative Entry and Exit Costs  
 
 
Note: The level of exit costs (pK
- ) is always 50 percent of pK
+. 
 
Figure 7: Hiring and Firing Thresholds for ψ = 1.5 versus ψ = 1.6 and K = 2 versus K = 2.5  
 
         
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2005doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2005)6) also includes indicators of administrative 
barriers to entrepreneurship  .  
27  The gulf between the Anglo-American world and Europe is striking: According to Djankov et al. (2002) 
establishing a firm in the US costs less than 1% of per capita GDP, while establishing a firm in continental Europe 
costs 18.4% of per capita GDP. In other words, the continental European entry barriers are an order of magnitude 
larger.  
  18In a model with capital and labour F(K,L), firms would also adjust labour in order to maintain an 
optimal capital-labour ratio. The left and right panel of Figure 7 shows the hiring and firing thresholds 
for K = 2 (solid lines) and K = 2.5 (dotted lines) for ψ = 1.5 versus ψ = 1.6. Taking all the numerical 
simulations into consideration, we conclude that streamlined regulation indeed offers win-win 
opportunities. This confirms the mounting empirical evidence in the literature that lighter regulation can 
be an effective way to boost investment and employment.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
There is growing belief that the relatively poorer performance of some European countries – as 
compared to the U.S. – in terms of growth and employment during the last decade can be at least 
partially explained by the interaction of product and factor markets. This paper is an attempt at 
providing a unifying modelling framework that makes explicit and clarifies thinking on the inter-
linkages between regulation, investment and employment.
28 The simulation exercises show that the 
intensity of product market competition variable in tandem with hiring and firing costs is an important 
driver of employment and growth. An important implication of our model is that product market 
deregulation may be very effective in terms of increasing factor demand. Another conclusion is that the 
impact of any one policy measure is greater if it is pushed through in tandem with other reforms than if 
it is implemented in isolation.
29 
This is by no means the last word on the causes of Europe´s unemployment. But the lessons are very 
clear indeed. Streamlining product market regulation is likely to be beneficial for employment and 
growth and would therefore support the policy objectives established within the Lisbon agenda of the 
EU.
30 The simulation results also indicate that product market reforms help to make labour market 
reforms more acceptable for unions.
31 
                                                           
28 Our model ignores behavioural assumptions regarding market rivalry, which in turn would necessitate some 
kind of game-theoretic analysis to take account of the strategic interactions among the firms, the results of which 
are in turn heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the information sets available and the type of game being 
played. The ramifications of competitive interaction on the decision making of firms have been discussed by Smit 
and Ankum (1993) and Leahy (1993). Leahy (1993) has shown that the assumption of myopic firms who ignore 
the impact of other firms´ actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger factor demand as a model in 
which firms correctly anticipate the strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) has recently extended Leahy´s 
(1993) “Principle of Optimality of Myopic Behavior” to the apparently more complex case of dynamic oligopoly 
under uncertainty. Both papers therefore permit to bypass strategic general equilibrium considerations when 
analysing factor demand under uncertainty. 
29 There are important dynamic effects which are not captured by our estimates. For example, the recent empirical 
literature suggests a positive relationship between product market competition and innovation [see, e.g. Nickell 
(1996)]. 
30 The interactions between product and factor markets may also help to understand why decelerating real wages 
have not translated into visibly lower unemployment in some countries in the euro area.  
31  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have also suggested to cut barriers to product market competition first as 
product market deregulation should increase employment. Higher employment would buy goodwill from unions 
and ease implementation of additional labour market reforms.  
  19Before ending, we should note one important caveat of our approach. Our objective is limited to 
studying the factor demand implications of product-market regulation. It is not our purpose to evaluate 
the impact of regulation on social goals that could be beyond the strict sphere of employment and 
economic growth. Thus, our conclusions on the impact of regulation should be evaluated in a more 
comprehensive context before drawing welfare implications.     
 
  20Appendix A: The Derivation of (21) 
 
Assume that the particular solution for the shadow price of capitals, q, has the following functional 
form as the particular integral components: 
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Substituting the above equations into equation (19) in the text yields 
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Appendix B: The Derivation of (22) and (23) 
 
Now only focusing on the homogenous part of equation (19), 
 





η λ δ δ + + − − = +   
 
The shadow price of capitals, q, should have the following functional form as the particular integral 
components: 
 



















L ZK A q , 
 
where β  and A are unknown constants. Then, we have, 
 



































































































































Substituting the above equations into equation (B1) yields 
 




































There, we have (23), the characteristic equation, in the text: 
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G , 
 
where  1 β  and  2 β  are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic equation (B7). 
 
Appendix C: The Derivation of (24) 
 
Assume that the particular solution for the shadow price of capitals, q, has the following functional 
form as the particular integral components: 
 











where E and F are unknown constants. Then, we have 
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λ λ L EZK L qL . 
 
Substituting the above equations into equation (19) in the text yields 
 
(C6)  () () [] 0
1 1 1
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Appendic D: The Derivation of (25) and (26): 
 
Now only focusing on the homogenous part of equation (20), 
 





η λ δ λ + + − − = + . 
 






















L ZK A v , 
 
where β  and A are unknown constants. Then, we have, 
 









































































































































Substituting the above equations into equation (D1) yields 
 






































There, we have (23), the characteristic equation, in the text: 
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G , 
 
where  3 β  and  4 β  are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic equation (D7). 
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